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The Effectiveness of Judicial Activism:
Desegregation and Racial Attitudes
by
Steven E. Hugie

The relationship between Supreme Coun desegregation rulings and the racial tolerance
of Americans is examined. Comprehensive summaries are given of the desegregation cases and
public opinion survey data on the question of public school desegregation from 1954 to present.
While some question the constitutionality of judicial activism, it is defended on the gounds tht
it is an effective means for achieving imponant social ends. Data show that when (from the 1954
Brown decision to the 1974 Milliken decision) the Coun pressed for desegregation, the public
responded more positively to opinion poll questions about the appropriateness ofracially balanced
schools. Milliken represented a turning point fro the Coun. Since the coun began weakening
its demands for integration, public opinion has been much less favorable on racial integration.
The legitimation hypothesis is defended, placing the responsibility for deteriorating racial attitudes
on a Coun which could, but is unwilling to, change those attitudes. Alternative explanations,
which would attribute the decline in racial attitudes to the failures ofdesegregation, are discredited
as inconsistent with sociological expectations.

Introduction

The words of Martin Luther King, Jr.
rang loud in the segregated South: "I have
a dream that one day on the red hills of
Georgia the sons of fonner slaves and the sons
of fonner slaveowners will be able to sit down
together at the table of brotherhood" (D' Amato
1987, 357). Desegregation of the public
schools was one of the principal aims of the
civil rights movement led by King. The
National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (represented by Thurgood
Marshall) took to the court dockets for redress
of the wrongs that executives and legislators
had ignored. Now, thirty-four years after their
victory in Brown et al v. Board of Education
of Topeka (1954), a police brutality incident
in Los Angeles, a Hispanic uprising in our

nation's capital, and litigation from Mississippi
claiming that "unconstitutional vestiges of
desegregation remain and should be ordered
eliminated" have brought race relations once
again to the American consciousness (Appleborne 1991, A16). Desegregation has fallen
on hard times.
One avowed aim of desegregation was
the elimination of racism, "both root and
branch" (U.S. v. Mississippi, 1989). Measuring racial attitudes as a product of desegregation will reflect on the effectiveness of judicial
activism as well as the social influence of
education. Before discussing desegregation,
however, we must place it within the context
of a larger constitutional debate over what the
Supreme Court's role in such questions should
be.

The .Judicial Activism Debate

Methodology and Thesis

The debate over judicial activism has
its roots in the origins of American government. The Constitution did not explicitly grant
the authority of judicial review to the Supreme
Court. Now the Constitution is being interpreted by a Court which makes a broad range
of policy decisions that otherwise would be
reserved to the more "democratic" executive
and legislative branches. Wechsler and Berger
warn that "court decisions should be explicitly
based on neutral, general principles that
transcend a particular result"; otherwise, they
violate the separation of powers and threaten
democratic government (Rebell and Block
1982, 6, 8).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 echoes
this anti-activist stand on desegregation, saying
that it

The justifiability of judicial activism
depends, at least in part, on the measure of
its effectiveness. The major public school
desegregation cases spanning from the Brown
decision in 1954 down to the present will be
examined in conjunction with data from public
opinion polls that measure public responses
to this question: "Do you think white students
and black students should go to the same
schools or separate schools" (Gilbert 1987,
267)? It will be shown that while the Court
pursued desegregation, racial tolerance
increased; but during the period in which it
has become less assertive, there has been a
downturn in racial tolerance, suggesting that
the Court can and does influence racial
attitudes.

does not mean the assignment of students to
public schools to overcome racial imbalance and
that nothing therein empowers any official or
court of the United States to issue any order
requiring the transportation of pupils or students
from one school to another or one school district
to another in order to achieve racial balance
(Trenker 1989, 672-3).

The Court decided to desegregate at any cost.
Scholars who defend the Court's policy
making role argue that the rise of the welfare
state has led to the activist intrusion of all three
branches into· our lives and that the Court is
just keeping pace. While others question the
Court's abilities in fact-finding and remedial
action, defenders of activism argue that "courts
protect the basic constitutional rights of
minorities ... when other institutions are unwilling to deal with important social issues"
(Rebell and Block 1982, 1O). They argue that
the founders did not intend an absolute
separation of powers but rather a blending of
those powers as they were shared by three
coordinate branches of government.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Much work has been done examining
the interaction of public opinion and Supreme
Court decisions. When the Court takes a stand
on visible and controversial issues, argue some
theorists, the body of thought that they uphold
is validated as "politically correct." The
legitimation hypothesis emphasizes the degree
of compliance and support that accompany
Supreme Court rulings (Marshall 1989, 135}.
Public opinion, according to this theory, would
be expected to shift favorably toward the position of the Court. Hence, the Court can and
does have a profound influence on Americans'
atti tudes and the nation's policy agenda.
The work of sociologist Cardell C.
Jacobson equips the legitimation hypothesis
with approximate controls for all variables
external to the ruling itself (social factors,
implementation, and other policies such as
affirmative action). He conducted a survey
in the months before and after a Milwaukee
desegregation ruling. Among those directly
affected by the ruling, 8.1 % fewer of them
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said that they would object to their children
attending racially balanced schools after the
ruling than before (1978, 703):
There were no increased intergroup contacts,
no changes in school feeder patterns, no
increased neighborhood integration. There was
only the ruling. Like several earlier investigators
of law and attitudes we have found that the law
can change public opinion (1978, 705).

Franklin and Kosaki fine-tuned the
legitimation hypothesis and renamed it the
positive response hypothesis, but argued that
the effects of the ruling on long-held social
values are mitigated as "social communication
processes become the dominant influence"
(1989, 766). These processes are defined as
interactions within an individual's own racial
or ethnic group. The reasoning behind this
theory is not unlike that which justified the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896). Other researchers have come
to the same conclusion. Muir and McGlamery
found that while white students displayed more
acceptance of blacks as classmates (from 56.4
percent in 1963 to 96.7 percent in 1982), "data
reveal that this trend has not just slowed but
actually reversed, with an increased portion
of white undergraduates believing that blacks
are relatively lazy, untrustworthy, immoral,
and vengeful" (1984, 968).
Longshore asserts that desegregation
may sow the seeds of its own destruction
because of a phenomenon that he calls
territorial instinct. He found that "even when
students of one race are greatly outnumbered,
their attitudes are more favorable than when
the school is racially balanced, because control
of the school is not in dispute" (1982, 675).
He proposes the use of situation-specific
remedies rather than universal judicial decrees.
Thus, most researchers assert that while
desegregation might have seemed like a good
idea at first, it has failed to achieve its desired

results in the long run. The case often singled
out for such analysis is Milliken v. Bradley
(1974), which was accompanied by a two point
positive poll shift from the pre- to postdecision
period, while the long term poll shift was
negative eight points (Marshall 1989147, 155).
It will be shown, however, that the negative
opinion shifts in the wake of Milliken reflected
the subtle "throttling back" of the Court on
desegregation. The explanatory value of the
legitimation hypothesis will be illustrated by
examining desegregation cases and placing
them on a public opinion continuum from 1954
to the present.
Findines

HNory of Public School Desegregation Cases

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) established
the doctrine of "separate but equal facilities"
for members of different races, citing congressional segregation of Washington, D. C.
public schools as justification. Brown v. Board
(1954) reversed Plessy, calling separate
facilities "inherently unequal," and stated that
the opportunity of education, "where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms"
(483). The Court had started down the road
to desegregation, a road that it would continue
to take until 1974.
Brown (II) (1955), issued one year
later, required compliance with the original
decree "with all deliberate speed". The
decisions met massive resistance, especially
in the South, but the Court in Cooper v. Aaron
(1958) unanimously reaffinnedBrown. When,
in 1964, Prince Edward County, Virginia
schools remained mostly segregated the Court
declared that "the time for more deliberate
speed had run out" (Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 1964).
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School boards defended themselves by
saying that they allowed students the "freedomof-choice" to go to any school they chose, but
the Court held in Green v. New Kent County
School Board that "[the open-enrollment] plan
has operated simply to burden children and
their parents with a responsibility which Brown
1I placed squarely on the School Board" (1964,
430). The Court went farther out on a limb,
requiring not only that school districts allow
students to choose which school they would
like to go to, but that they also take steps
(busing being one) to facilitate racial diversity
in each school.
Opposition persisted. "[T]he Supreme
Court rejected [Nixon] Administration-sponsored delay requests in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board ofEducation (1969) and Caner

v. West Feliciana Parish School Board (1970)"
(Levy 1986, 559). By 1974, however, the
Court's resolve had eroded. Milliken v.
Bradley (1974) was the first case to strike
down ajudicial desegregation order, an order
involving several school districts, not all of
which discriminated. Thus, they rejected the
only possibility of having integrated schools
where "white flight" to the suburbs had left
a high concentration of minorities in inner-city
districts.
From 1974 on, the liberal-activist
judges (notably Brennan and Marshall) were
consistently on the dissenting side of desegregation opinions. More difficult standards for
proving discrimination were set forth in a
number of cases. "There was little judicial
enthusiasm for continued reliance on a
remedial process about which there was so
much controversy as to its effectiveness ... "
(Levy 1986, 560). In 1975, the Court
accepted partial desegregation in Calhoun v.
Cook and did basically the same thing in
Milliken v. Bradley 1I (1977). The Court held
that resegregation after integration need not
be corrected by the courts in Pasadena Board

ofEducation v. Spangler (1976). Finally, the
1982 Crawford v. Los Angeles Unified School
District case validated this California proposition: "State courts shall not order mandatory
pupil assignment or transportation unless a
federal court would do so to remedy a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause" (527).
While the Court has remained mostly
silent on public school desegregation cases
since 1982, it has allowed lower court rulings
to stand that have made it more difficult for
parent organizations to obtain standing
(Morgan v. McDonough 1984), has placed the
burden of proof squarely on those who
challenge a school district that has declared
itself unitary, and has granted "relief against
school board's 'bussing' plan to promote
desegregation" (Trenker 1989, 674). Still
other lower court decisions (such as United
States v. Mississippi [1989] and Whittenberg
v. School District [1985]) have relaxed
desegregation rules and been decided in favor
of the school districts whose policies are
challenged. Although they do not abandon
Brown, these lower court opinions (tacitly
approved by the Supreme Court) have departed
from the activist traditions of the 50s, 60s,
and half of the 70s. The recent conservativism
of the Court on racial issues can also be
illustrated by race-related cases such as Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) and
Bazemore v. Friday (1986) that have also
found Brennan and other desegregation
activists in the minority. An examination of
the history of these cases shows a shift in the
Court's posture on desegregation and racial
issues. How does this shift relate to patterns
in public racial attitudes? To this question
we turn next.

Evolution of Racial Attitudes

Brown was a watershed of racial
tolerance for Americans. In 1964 34.5 percent
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of eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds polled
said that they were in favor of deseg-regation.
By 1972, nearly 51 percent agreed. Between
1972 and 1974 (exactly when Milliken brought
the judicial pendulum swinging back to the
right) there was a sharp downturn and by 1978
only 32.8 percent polled were in favor of

desegregation--Iess than in 1964 (Converse
et al 1980, 64). This trend seems to have
persisted. A June 1990 Gallup poll reports
that only 33 percent of eighteen to twenty-nineyear-oIds polled feel like they have become
more tolerant of people of different colors and
races (Newport 1990, 32).

Supreme Court Cases
and Attitudes on Desegregation
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The declining proportion of positive
racial responses of students corresponds with
a similar pattern in their parents. A 1990
Gallup Poll found:
10% of whites saying they would object to
sending their child to a school where half of the
students were black. That proportion increased
to 31 % when asked if they would object to
sending their child to a school where more than
half of the children were black (Newport 1990,
25).

Polls show that there has been only a modest
increase (from 30 percent in 1973 to 37
percent in 1988) in those who feel that more
should be done to integrate our schools
(Shriver 1988, 46). These data show that
racism and separatism are not, as we might
like to think, unfortunate relics of the past.
The most continuous, representative,
and random data is provided in the figure
which traces overall public opinion on integration from 1940 to 1985. When the cases
we have examined are plotted along the x-axis,
we can see an almost linear increase of the
Brown to Caner period. After Milliken, the
trend stops and has flattened significantly as
the Court has become less active in school
integration.

Analysis
Review of the Data
In the figure, all shown cases from

Brown to Caner were decided in favor of
integration and were relatively activist decisions. Milliken in 1974 and all subsequent
cases did not reverse Brown but represent a
departure from the Court's activist position.
The pre-Brown period saw the initiation of
positive racial attitudes. This jump from 2
percent to 15 percent positive responses

coincides with the first two cases in which the
Supreme Court upheld the rights of black
citizens, Smith v. Allwright (1944) and Shelley
v. Kramer (1948) (Schaefer 1990,219). The
1954 Brown decision creates an even sharper
increase in positive responses, a trend that
continued until the Milliken decision. As
Figure 1 shows, since Milliken, the Court's
negative posture towards desegregation and
race related cases has corresponded with steady
or only minutely increasing positive public
responses to the question of integration.

Theoretical Implications
This analysis, particularly in light of
the dramatic shift in the early 1970s, supports
the legitimation hypothesis. To the extent that
this correlation is not mere coincidence,
alternative hypotheses are discredited.
Proponents of the positive response/ social communication hypothesis would
attribute this renewed polarization to the
influence of primary social institutions (friends
and family) and/or a resurgence of ethnicity.
However, most sociological models emphasize
assimilation or pluralism rather than conflict' .
After 300 years of cohabitation and black
attempts to assimilate into white society, we
should be able to expect successful integration.
Those sociologists who do predict a resurgence
of ethnicity do not expect this to occur until
the third generation after a strong push for
assimilation (in this case the Brown decision)
(Schaefer 1990, 142-3)2.
The territoriality theory is also discredited by the exact coincidence of Milliken
and the decline in racial attitudes. Moreover,
territorial conflicts could only be expected
where there is a nearly perfect balance of black
and white students. Blacks represent only 12
percent of the population and do not account
for 50 percent of the student body in a majority
of schools.
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The social communication or territoriality hypotheses would attribute the deterioration of racial attitudes to the failures of
desegregation (see Table 2). The data show,
however, that so long as the Court was willing
to take a stand in favor of desegregation,
public racial attitudes improved. The opposite
was true when the Court softened its activist
stance on desegregation. The legitimation
hypothesis is consistent with both trends.

Table I. Theories and implications.
HYPOTHESIS:

IMPLICATION:

Legitimation

Court lost resolve

Positive
Response

Desegregation failed

Territoriality

Desegregation failed

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Analysis of this type carries with it
the persistent subjectivity of the social sciences. People who agree generally to the
principle of desegregation may nonetheless
oppose specific remedies such as busing.
Politically correct professions of racial
tolerance might only mask the persistent hatred
of a "timid bigot" (Schaefer 1990, 56)3.
Another limitation encountered in this type
of study is that it is easier to explain conclusively the shifts in public opinion before and
after the first ruling on a controversial issue
than it is to explain shifts in opinion in concert
with subsequent rulings.
This study focuses on the aim of
improving racial tolerance; other research has
and will focus on the accessibility to quality
education and student attainment. Future
researchers might also look at the role of
media, the executive and legislative actions
of the same period, racial lobbying efforts,

and other political factors. Racial violence
is, unfortunately, an increasingly available
variable that will be useful for future studies.

Conclusion
By examining the relationship between
Supreme Court decisions and racial attitudes
we have seen the effect that the Court can and
does have on public opinion. The period of
activist desegregation coincided with dramatic
increases in racial tolerance. Since 1974,
however, the Court has taken a much more
conservative stance and public opinion has
deteriorated .
The implications are profound. Racial
tensions and conflict are on the rise. The
conservative Court's current session will
address desegregation for the first time in
years. The outcome will be as impressive as
Brown and therefore should be of great interest
to all of us. Just how effective can an activist
Court be in "correct[ing], by balancing of the
individual and collective interest, the condition
which offends the Constitution" (Trenker 1989,
672)? It can be very effective. Should the
Court assert itself as it did before 1974? It
should. Will Martin Luther King's dream ever
become a reality? We can only hope that it
will.

NOTES
1. See Richard T. Schaefer, Radal and Ethnic Groups
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1990),
p.43-47.

2. Schaefer refers to the work of Marcus Lee Hansen.
See The Problem o/the Third Generation Immigrant, (Rock
Island, Ill.: Swenson Swedish Immigration Research
Center, 1987).
3. See also Robertk K. Merton, Sodological Ambivalence
and Other Essays, (New York: Free Press, 1976).
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